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THE BREADTH OF FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE
803(8)(C): BEECH AIRCRAFT CORP. v. RAINEY
DAVID W. KIRKMAN
O N JULY 13, 1982 Lieutenant Commander Barbara
A nn Rainey, a United States Navy flight instructor,
and her student, Ensign Donald Bruce Knowlton, flew a
training exercise over Middleton Field, Alabama. Ensign
Knowlton had successfully piloted the T-34C Turbo-Men-
tor aircraft through several landings and takeoffs.' As the
plane took off the fourth time, it appeared to cut off an-
other aircraft in the flight pattern. After radio warnings
from other pilots in the area, the T-34C turned sharply to
the right. At that point, the plane rapidly lost altitude and
crashed in a wooded area southeast of Middleton Field.
2
Lieutenant Commander Rainey and Ensign Knowlton
died in the crash. Their spouses, John Charles Rainey
and Rondi M. Knowlton, sought money damages under
the Florida Wrongful Death Act in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Florida.4 They al-
leged negligence and products liability causes of action
I Rainey v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 784 F.2d 1523, 1525 (1.1th Cir.) [hereinafter
Rainey 11, vacated, 791 F.2d 833 (11 th Cir. 1986), reinstated, 827 F.2d 1498 (11 th
Cir. 1987) (en banc), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 439 (1988). Rainey and Knowlton were
practicing a "touch and go" training exercise in which the student circles the air-
field in an oval pattern and then lands the aircraft. After landing, the student ac-
celerates the plane and takes off again. Id. at 1525 n.2.
Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 109 S. Ct. 439, 443 (1988) [hereinafter Rainey
III]; see infra note 8 for citation to Rainey I.
:, Rainey Ill, 109 S.Ct. at 443.
4 Rainey I, 784 F.2d at 1526. Although Rainey and Knowlton filed individual
suits as the personal representatives of their decedent spouse's estates and on
behalf of their minor children, the two cases were consolidated for all purposes,
including trial. Id. at 1525 n.l.
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against defendants Beech Aircraft Corporation, Pratt and
Whitney Canada, Inc., and Beech Aerospace Services,
Inc.5
The disputed issue at trial was the cause of the fatal
crash.6 Lieutenant Commander William C. Morgan, Jr.
conducted an investigation into the circumstances of the
crash on order of the squadron's commanding officer and
pursuant to authorization in the Manual of the Judge Ad-
vocate General(JAG). 7 Morgan produced a written JAG
Report of his investigation that included his findings of
fact, opinions, and recommendations concerning the inci-
dent.8 One of Morgan's opinions was that "[t]he most
probable cause of the accident was the pilots [sic] failure
to maintain interval." 9 Plaintiffs Rainey and Knowlton did
not agree. Rainey, himself a flight instructor with the
United States Navy, had written a letter to Morgan ex-
pressing his belief that the crash was the result of a fuel
malfunction that caused an in-flight power interruption.' 0
District court Judge Winston Arnow made two crucial
evidentiary rulings in the case. First, the trial judge ad-
mitted excerpts from the investigative report prepared by
Morgan, including his opinions concerning the probable
Id. at 1526. Beech Aircraft manufactured the T-34C Turbo Mentor aircraft;
Pratt and Whitney manufactured the engine in the aircraft; Beech Aerospace was
under a United States Navy contract for maintenance service on the aircraft. Id.
,; Rainey III, 109 S.Ct. at 443 ("Because of the damage to the plane and the lack
of any survivors, the cause of the accident could not be determined with
certainty.").
7Id.
s Rainey v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 827 F.2d 1498, 1500 (11 th Cir. 1987) [herein-
after Rainey II] (en banc), rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 439 (1988). In the concurring opinion
in Rainey H, Judge Tjoflat included a complete text of Morgan's written report. Id.
at 1502 (Tjoflat,J., concurring). The findings of fact portion included such state-
ments as: "At approximately 1020, while turning crosswind without proper inter-
val, 3E955 [the plane] crashed, immediately caught fire and burned." Id. at 1503
(Tjoflat, J., concurring).
Id. at 1501 (Tjoflat,J., concurring). The term "interval" refers to the distance
between Rainey and Knowlton's aircraft and another aircraft in the flight pattern.
Id.
,0 Rainey 1, 784 F.2d at 1526 ("According to Rainey, this malfunction prompted
an inflight 'power interruption' or 'rollback' making it impossible for Lieutenant
Commander Rainey to sustain sufficient power to maintain flight.").
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cause of the crash, into evidence." Second, although
Judge Arnow allowed Beech Aircraft's counsel to question
Rainey about portions of his letter to Morgan, he did not
allow plaintiff's counsel to question Rainey about his
opinions in the same letter concerning the cause of the
crash. 12  The jury concluded that the defendants should
not be held responsible and returned a verdict against the
plaintiffs.' 3
On appeal, a panel of the Eleventh Circuit reversed the
district court on both evidentiary rulings.' 4 The court de-
termined that Morgan's report must satisfy the hearsay
exception for public investigatory records and reports in
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8)(C)[hereinafter the Rule
or Rule 803(8)(C)] to be admissible.' 5 The Rule allows
the admission of reports of public agencies that set forth
factual findings resulting from an investigation made pur-
suant to authority granted by law. In Smith v. Ithaca
Corp. ,16 the Fifth Circuit determined that Rule 803(8)(C)
excludes opinion and conclusory material contained in
1 Id. At the pretrial conference Judge Arnow ruled that Morgan's report was
trustworthy and admissible only with regard to its factual findings. The day
before trial, however, the judge reversed in part his prior ruling and decided that
the opinions and conclusions contained in the investigative report could also be
admitted. Id. at 1526 n.5.
12 Id. at 1528-29.
11 Id. at 1526.
14 Id. at 1530.
- Id. at 1528. Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8) provides:
Rule 803. Hearsay Exceptions; Availability of Declarant Immaterial
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though
the declarant is available as a witness: . . . (8) Public records and
reports. Records, reports, statements, or data compilations, in any
form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth (A) the activities of
the office or agency, or (B) matters observed pursuant to a duty im-
posed by law as to which matters there was a duty to report, exclud-
ing, however, in criminal cases matters observed by police officers
and other law enforcement personnel, or (C) in civil actions and pro-
ceedings and against the Government in criminal cases, factual find-
ings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority
granted by law, unless the sources of information or other circum-
stances indicate lack of trustworthiness.
FED. R. EVID. 803(8).
- 612 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1980); see infra notes 102-107 and accompanying text
for a detailed discussion of Smith.
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such reports. The panel in Rainey I recognized that they
were constrained by the Smith precedent to hold that Mor-
gan's opinions as to the cause of the incident were not
admissible.' 7 In considering whether plaintiff's counsel
should have been allowed to cross-examine Rainey as to
the contents of his letter to Morgan, the panel relied on
Federal Rule of Evidence 106. 8 The court determined
that Rule 106 allowed Rainey to testify about all relevant
portions of the letter for the sake of completeness.' 9 The
panel held, therefore, that the district court erred in ad-
mitting into evidence the opinions contained in Morgan's
JAG Report and in limiting Rainey's testimony regarding
the letter. Judge Johnson concurred in an opinion that
called for the Eleventh Circuit to consider the evidentiary
issues relating to Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8)(C) en
banc.2 o
The Eleventh Circuit voted to hear the case en banc to
reconsider the admissibility of opinions expressed in in-
vestigative reports. 2' The en banc court unanimously up-
held the panel's conclusion that Rainey should have been
allowed to testify about the opinions expressed in his let-
ter to Morgan.2 2 However, on the Rule 803(8)(C) eviden-
,7 Rainey 1, 784 F.2d at 1528. When the Eleventh Circuit was established Octo-
ber 1, 1981, the judges voluntarily agreed that decisions of the former Fifth Cir-
cuit would be binding as precedent. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206,
1207 (11 th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
1" Rainey 1, 784 F.2d at 1529. Federal Rule of Evidence 106 provides: "When a
writing or recorded statement or part thereof is introduced by a party, an adverse
party may require the introduction at that time of any other part or any other
writing or recorded statement which ought in fairness to be considered contem-
poraneously with it." FED. R. EviD. 106.
Rainey 1, 784 F.2d at 1529.
Id. at 1530 (Johnson,J., concurring). JudgeJohnson stated:
Smith is an anomaly among the circuits. The majority view favors
broad admissibility under Rule 803(8)(C)'s "factual findings" stan-
dard .... Broad admissibility releases trial judges from the duty to
draw sometimes arbitrary lines between fact and opinion, and fo-
cuses the court's inquiry instead on the trustworthiness and rele-
vance of the reports in question.
Id.
- Rainey II, 827 F.2d at 1498.
'-2 Id. at 1500. The Supreme Court majority decision affirmed the court of ap-
peals ruling that Rainey should have been permitted to give a more complete
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tiary question, the court divided evenly. Six judges
wanted to retain the narrow standard enunciated in Smith,
and six judges expressed a desire to overrule Smith and to
expand the interpretation of Federal Rule of Evidence
803(8)(C). 2" The court recognized that without a majority
vote for change, the Smith standard controlled.24
The defendants petitioned the Supreme Court for writ
of certiorari to hear the case. The Supreme Court
granted the writ 25 and handed down its decision on De-
cember 12, 1988.26 The Supreme Court unanimously held
that "statements in the form of opinion or conclusions are
not by that fact excluded from the scope of Federal Rule
of Evidence 803(8)(C). ' 7 The Court reversed the judg-
ment of the Court of Appeals, and defined the scope of
admissibility under Rule 803(8)(C) in broad terms.
This comment examines the background of Federal
Rule of Evidence 803(8) (C) and how the Supreme Court's
decision in Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey (Rainey III) will af-
picture of the letter he had written to Morgan. Justice Brennan stated: "We have
no doubt that the jury was given a distorted and prejudicial impression of Rainey's
letter. The theory of Rainey's case was that the accident was the result of a power
failure, and, read in its entirety, his letter to Morgan was fully consistent with that
theory." Rainey III, 109 S. Ct. at 450.
In a dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice O'Connor,
found that Rainey's attorney had not made a sufficient offer of proof on the com-
pleteness question to reverse the trial judge. The Chief Justice explained:
Trial judges do not have the luxury of briefs or research when mak-
ing a typical evidentiary ruling, and for this reason we have tradition-
ally required the proponent of evidence to defend it against
objection by showing why it should be admissible .... This Court,
far removed from the factual context and on the basis of a cold rec-
ord, is in no position to say that the trial court's ruling in this situa-
tion was an abuse of discretion.
Id. at 454. The balance of this comment does not discuss further the evidentiary
issues regarding Rainey's letter to Morgan.
-'-. Rainey 1I, 827 F.2d at 1501 ("Judges Roney, Godbold, Hill, Fay, Vance and
Clark would all adhere to Smith. Judges Tjoflat, Kravitch, Johnson, Hatchett, An-
derson and Edmonson would follow the reasoning suggested in Judge Johnson's
concurring opinion and overrule Smith.").
24 Id.
2r Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 108 S. Ct. 1073 (1988).
., Rainey III, 109 S. Ct. at 439. Defendant Pratt & Whitney settled with the
plaintiffs and was dismissed as a party to the case. Id. at 443 n. I.
._7 Id. at 453.
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fect the Rule's implementation in the future. Section I
sets out the common law development of an exception to
the hearsay doctrine for public reports and records.28
Section II looks at the evidentiary attempts to discern fact
from opinion and how the difficulty in making that distinc-
tion arose in public records and reports. 29 Section III ex-
amines the creation of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
focusing on the legislative intent behind Rule 803(8) (C).30
Section IV surveys the different approaches that courts
have taken in construing the language of Rule 803(8)(C).
Section IV is organized into three subsections: subsection
A surveys cases that limit the scope of the Rule;31 subsec-
tion B surveys cases that broaden the inclusiveness of the
Rule; 32 and subsection C examines the trustworthiness re-
quirement of the Rule.3 3 Section V analyzes the Supreme
Court's reasoning in Rainey III and the effect the holding
will have on the future interpretation of Rule 803(8)(C).3 4
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE PUBLIC REPORTS
AND RECORDS EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY
DOCTRINE
At common law, an exception to the hearsay doctrine 35
See infra notes 35-53 and accompanying text for a discussion of the develop-
ment of a public records exception.
29 See infra notes 54-76 and accompanying text for discussion of the problematic
fact/opinion distinction.
ml See infra notes 77-95 and accompanying text for a discussion of the legislative
history of Rule 803(8) (C).
., See infra notes 96-132 and accompanying text for a discussion of the cases
that hold Rule 803(8)(C) admits only the factual portions of public reports.
:"! See infra notes 133-162 and accompanying text for a discussion of the cases
that interpret the language of Rule 803(8)(C) to allow admissibility of the opinion
and conclusory portions of a public report.
1:1 See infra notes 163-186 and accompanying text for a discussion of the use of
the trustworthiness provision in Rule 803(8)(C) to deny admissibility to public
reports.
:4 See infra notes 187-238 and accompanying text for a discussion of Rainey III.
. Hearsay was defined at common law as "that kind of evidence which does not
derive its value solely from the credit to be attached to the witness himself, but
rests, also, in part, on the veracity and competency of some other person." Hopt
v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574 (1884). The Federal Rules currently define hearsay as "a
statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or
hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." FED. R.
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developed for the written records and reports of govern-
ment officials."' Part of the rationale for admitting these
public reports was necessity; demanding live testimony
from official sources was inefficient. 7 The public suffers
when a government official is removed from the perform-
ance of his function.3 ' Another justification for the excep-
tion is rooted in a public official's performance. There is
an assumption that a public official will perform his or her
duty properly." '
As courts began to allow the admission of governmen-
tal and public reports under this hearsay exception, they
began to face records that included not only facts, but
also opinions and conclusory statements. 4o The common
law courts grappled with the decision on which of these
evaluative portions of a record should be admissible.4'
Evin. 801 (C). The hearsay doctrine is the fundamental requirement that such evi-
dence should not be admitted at trial. Beyond reiterating this basic premise, fur-
ther discussion of the hearsay doctrine is beyond the scope of this comment.
- See E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 315, at 888 (3d ed. 1984); FED. R.
EviD. 803(8) advisory committee's note.
:,7 5J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1631, at 617-18 (J. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1974).
:11 Id.; see also E. C.EARY, supra note 36, § 315, at 889 ("Not only would [requir-
ing officials to testifyl disrupt the administration of public affairs, but it almost
certainly would create a class of official witnesses.").
:- See Chesapeake & Del. Canal Co. v. United States, 250 U.S. 123 (1919). The
Court found that Treasury Department books'
character as public records required by law to be kept, the official
character of their contents entered under the sanction of public
duty, the obvious necessity for regular contemporaneous entries in
them and the reduction to a minimum of motive on the part of pub-
lic officials and employees to either make false entries or to omit
proper ones, all unite to make these books admissible as unusually
trustworthy sources of evidence.
Id. at 128-29; 4 1). .O1tSt.LL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 455, at 735
(1980) ("Ilt is assumed that responsible persons within the agency gathered the
information ... , carefully analyzed it and drew 'factual' ... conclusions from it.");
(. Wong Wing Foo %. McGrath, 196 F.2d 120, 123 (9th Cir. 1952) ("ITihere is a
great likelihood that a public official would have no memory at all respecting his
action in hundreds of entries that are little more than mechanical.").
Yates, Evaluative Reports by Public Officials - Admissible as Official Statements?, 30
TEx. . RE\V. 112 (1951).
" For decisions favoring admissibility, see United States v. Dumas, 149 U.S.
278. 285 (1893) (in suit against Postmaster an audited statement of account of the
delinquent payments by Postmaster admitted in evidence); McCartv v. United
States, 185 F.2d 520, 522 (5th Cir. 1950)(in suit by United States to recover for
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Indicative of the discrepant approaches courts developed
are the different results in Moran v. Pittsburgh Des Moines
Co. 42 and Franklin v. Skelly Oil Co. 43
Moran was an action for an accidental death arising out
of the explosion of a gas storage tank.44 The Third Cir-
cuit reversed the district court's exclusion of a report
completed by the Bureau of Mines in the wake of the gas
tank explosion.4 5 The appeals court admitted the report
under a then existing statute excepting business type
records from the hearsay doctrine.46 The court deter-
mined that the presence of the expert's conclusions in the
report went to the weight given the evidence, rather than
its admissibility.4 7 Although the decision relied on a busi-
ness records exception, it has been described as consis-
tent with the idea that opinions contained in public
reports are admissible.48
In Franklin the reviewing court sustained the exclusion
breach of contract to remove waste from Army camp, Certificate of Settlement of
General Accounting Office showing indebtedness admissible as official documents
in government files). For decisions denying admissibility, see Yung Jin Teun v.
Dulles, 229 F.2d 244, 247 (2d Cir. 1956) (in action by persons of Chinese origin
against State Department for denial of passport privileges, "Status Report" of
each applicant held inadmissible as official record because it was not prepared
from matters within personal knowledge of the record maker); Lomax Transp.
Co. v. United States, 183 F.2d 331, 333-34 (9th Cir. 1950) (in suit by United
States against Lomax for loss of naval supplies burned in Lomax warehouse, Cer-
tificate of Settlement from General Accounting Office claiming monetary losses
inadmissible to bind Lomax).
The use of the term evaluative throughout this comment is meant to define
reports based on investigation and observation, which, "unlike the usual official
statement, contain studied conclusions and opinions as well as facts." Yates, supra
note 40, at 112.
4._ 183 F.2d 467 (3d Cir. 1950).
4:1 141 F.2d 568 (10th Cir. 1944).
4 Moran, 183 F.2d at 467.
4 Id. at 473 ("The report is no less admissible because it contains conclusions
of experts which are based upon hearsay evidence as well as upon observatioh.").
46 Id. at 472 ("The offer of the 'eport was based upon the Uniform Business
Records as Evidence Act, as adopted by the General Assembly of Pennsylvania, 28
P.S. §§ 91a-91d, and upon the similar federal statute, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1732 (foot-
note omitted).").
47 Id. at 473.
.. See 4 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 39, § 455, at 734-35 n.48
("[T]his remarkably modern pre-Rules decision is plainly consistent with the
meaning and spirit of [Federal Rule of Evidence] 803(8)(C).").
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of a report required by state law that allocated the respon-
sibility for an explosion at the plaintiff's house to the de-
fendant's improper installation of a butane system.49 The
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit recognized that
elements of reliability, trustworthiness, and authenticity
usually justify the public record hearsay exception. 50 The
court, however, distinguished the opinion portions of the
report from the factual findings.5 Therefore, despite the
court's recognition of a public records exception, it did
not admit the opinions and conclusions regarding the bu-
tane explosion.5 2
The Tenth Circuit's distinction between fact and opin-
ion within the Fire Marshall's report reflects a common
law attempt to separate the two concepts. Although
courts struggled through decades of trying to exclude
opinion evidence, the Federal Rules now recognize a
broad trend towards the admissibility of opinion testi-
mony.53 This liberal trend regarding live opinion testi-
41 Franklin, 141 F.2d at 568.
• Id. at 572. The court held:
This universally recognized exception to the hearsay rule is based on
the reliability, trustworthiness and authenticity which usually attends
a public record or report made and kept in the performance of an
official function in behalf of the public interest. The exception has
been extended to include reports, findings and conclusions of public
officials concerning causes and effects when made in pursuance of
authority to conduct inquisitions and hearings in the public interest.
Id. (citations omitted).
6, Id. ("[E]xpressions of opinion and conclusions on causes and effects based
upon factual findings are not always admissible as public records .....
' Id.
Here the written statement of the inspector was offered for the pur-
pose of proving the primary issue of negligence in a private law-
suit .... The statement is not [admissible] . . . because the matter
and things contained therein express merely the opinion of one
whose official office and duty does not rise to the dignity of an adju-
dicator of causes and effects.
Id. (citations omitted).
See FED. R. EvID. 701. Rule 701 states:
[I]f the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness' testimony
in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or
inferences which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the
witness (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness' testimony
or the determination of a fact in issue.
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mony has not been as easily adopted with regard to
opinion portions of government records. Therefore, an
analysis of the public records hearsay exception requires a
discussion of the attempted distinction between fact and
opinion.
II. THE PROBLEM OF DISTINGUISHING FACT FROM
OPINION
In the 17th and 18th centuries, the rule developed in
English courts to exclude testimony based on any basis
other than personal knowledge.54 In the 1800's, English
writers paraphrased the rule as requiring witnesses to
state facts rather than opinions.55 United States courts
adopted this approach, commonly called the "opinion
rule", and attempted to admit only facts while excluding
inferences and opinions.56 The difficulty in distinguishing
between fact and opinion led to what one source called
"more than a hundred years of confusion. ' 57
The confusion developed out of the inherent miscon-
Id. Federal Rule of Evidence 702 states: "If scientific, technical, or other special-
ized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to deter-
mine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise." FED. R. EvID. 702. Federal Rule of Evidence 704 states in pertinent
part: "[T]estimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is
not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier
of fact." FED. R. EvID. 704. Federal Rule of Evidence 705 states that "[t]he ex-
pert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give reasons therefor without
prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data, unless the court requires other-
wise." FED. R. EvID. 705.
51 7 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1917, at 1-2 (J. Chadbourne rev. ed. 1978). In
1622 Lord Coke stated "[i]t is no satisfaction for a witness to say that he 'thinketh'
or 'persuadeth himself' .. " Id. § 1917, at 2. Lord Mansfield is attributed with
stating "Mere opinion . . . is not evidence." Id. § 1917, at 7.
r,5 3 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE 701[01], at 701-05
(1988).
.- See Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Schultz, 43 Ohio St. 270, 1 N.E. 324, 331-32 (1885)
("[W]itnesses shall testify to facts and not opinions is the general rule."); Graham
v. Pennsylvania Co., 139 Pa. 149, 21 A. 151, 153 (1891) ("[W]henever the circum-
stances can be fully and adequately described to the jury, and are such that their
bearing on the issue can be estimated by all men, without special knowledge or
training, opinions of witnesses, expert or other, are not admissible.").
57 3J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 55, 701[01], at 701-05 (quoting W.
KING & D. PILLINGER, OPINION EVIDENCE IN ILLINOIS 7 (1942)).
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ception upon which the fact/opinion dichotomy was
based. McCormick calls the assumption that fact and
opinion stand in contrast an illusion.5 8 Wigmore explains
that distinctions between the two are implausible. 59 Both
scholars argue that there is no legally definable line be-
tween fact and opinion, and, therefore, no independent
standard upon which trial judges can reach consistent re-
suits. 60  Under recent common law decisions and under
the Federal Rules, these considerable criticisms caused
the "opinion rule" to be severely disregarded in favor of
more liberal admission of opinion testimony.6' The mis-
conceptions of the "opinion rule", however, persisted in
court determinations regarding the admission of public
records and reports.
One area in which courts tried to distinguish fact and
opinion within government reports is in reports gener-
ated to help determine fault in airplane mishaps. When
Congress passed the Civil Aeronautics Act of 193862 and
5" E. CLEARY, supra note 36, § 11, at 27. The editors stated:
The difference between the statement, "He was driving on the left-
hand side of the road" which would be classed as "fact" under the
rule, and "He was driving carelessly" which would be called "opin-
ion" is merely a difference between a more concrete and specific
form of descriptive statement and a less specific and concrete form.
The difference between so-called "fact," then, and "opinion," is not
a difference between opposites or contrasting absolutes, but a mere
difference in degree with no recognizable line to mark the boundary.
Id.
' 7 J. WIGMORE, supra note 54, § 1919, at 14 (stating that "no such distinction
[between fact and opinion] is scientifically possible.").
- See E. CLEARY, Supra note 36, § 11, at 28; 7J. WIGMORE, supra note 54, § 1919,
at 14-17.
- See State v. Powell, 237 Iowa 1227, 1242, 24 N.W.2d 769, 778 (1946) ("The
distinction between fact and opinion statements sometimes grows thin."); Glaros
v. State, 223 Md. 272, 277, 164 A.2d 461, 464 (1960)("The assumption that there
is a difference in kind between 'fact' and 'opinion' has been said to be an illu-
sion."); see supra note 53 for a listing of the Federal Rules of Evidence that recog-
nize the admissibility of opinion testimony.
62 Pub. L. No. 75-706, 52 Stat. 973 (1938) [hereinafter The 1938 Act], repealed
by Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731 (codified as
amended at 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1301-1552 (1982)). Seegenerally Miller, Aviation Ac-
cident Investigation: Functional and Legal Perspectives, 46J. AIR L. & COM. 237, 237-54
(1981) (analysis of the legislative history and procedure of civil aviation accident
investigation).
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created the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) two years
later, it gave government agencies substantial responsibil-
ity for investigation of airplane accidents.63 One of the
provisions enacted by Congress limited the general public
record hearsay exception by excluding CAB reports from
use as evidence.64 Many courts, however, ignored the
Congressional intent and admitted portions of CAB find-
ings.65 Other courts admitted portions of these reports,
but attempted to distinguish between the admission of
factual observations, and the admission of opinions con-
cerning the cause of an incident. 66
Two cases that illustrate different approaches to the
fact/opinion material in CAB reports67 are Fidelity and Cas-
ualty Co. of New York v. Frank68 and American Airlines, Inc. v.
, See generally Comment, Admissibility of National Transportation Safety Board Reports
in CivilAir Crash Litigation, 53J. AIR L. & COM. 469, 471-73 (1987) (analysis of the
early case law and legislative response of aviation accident investigation that de-
veloped into more recent problems in using the results of NTSB investigations as
evidence at trial).
64 The 1938 Act, supra note 62, at § 701(e). The section states: "No part of any
report or reports of the [Civil Aeronautics] Board or the Authority relating to any
accident or the investigation thereof, shall be admitted as evidence or used in any
suit or action for damages growing out of any matter mentioned in such report or
reports". Id.
,: See Lobel v. American Airlines, Inc., 192 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1951) (CAB acci-
dent report held admissible because report contained only the investigator's per-
sonal observation about the airplane, and did not contain opinions or conclusions
as to the possible causes of the accident); Tansey v. Transcontinental & W. Air,
Inc., 97 F. Supp. 458 (D.D.C. 1949) (report prepared by airline employees pursu-
ant to CAB accident investigation held admissible); Ritts v. American Overseas
Airlines, Inc., 97 F. Supp. 457 (S.D.N.Y. 1947) (witness questioned by the CAB in
the course of an accident investigation permitted to testify).
.. See Berguido v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 317 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1963) (testi-
mony by CAB investigator about the technical observations of a member of the
investigatory staff held inadmissible); Israel v. United States, 247 F.2d 426 (2d
Cir. 1957) (trial court erred in finding fault based on the observations in a CAB
report concerning the conditions of a private airstrip that may have contributed to
a light plane crash).
67 In 1958, Congress created the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and
extended the CAB's responsibility over accident investigations. In that legisla-
tion, Congress restated the restriction on the use of CAB materials as evidence.
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, § 7 01 (e), 72 Stat. 731 (codified
at 49 U.S.C. app. § 1441(e) (1982)).
- 214 F. Supp. 803 (D. Conn. 1963), modified, 227 F. Supp. 948 (D. Conn.
1964).
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United States.69 The Frank case was an action between an
insurer and the beneficiary of the insured who died in an
airplane crash. The decedent's beneficiary sought to in-
troduce CAB accident reports into evidence.70 The court
admitted both the factual portions and opinion portions
of the reports. 7' Within a year, however, the court ren-
dered a second decision in the Frank case that altered the
standard of admissibility.7 2 The new standard chosen ex-
cluded all opinion and conclusory evidence.73
In American Airlines, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit rejected the limited standard enunciated by the
Frank court. In a suit over the crash of an American Air-
lines jet, the district court had admitted government re-
ports that exculpated both the Weather Bureau and the
air traffic controller, into evidence.7 4 On appeal, the court
determined that the analysis of technical information re-
garding the flight inherently required evaluative opin-
ion.75 The court, therefore, rejected the Frank approach
and found opinions to be generally admissible.76
These distinct approaches concerning CAB reports in-
.. 418 F.2d 180 (5th Cir. 1969).
7,, Frank, 214 F. Supp. at 805.
71 Id. at 806. The court determined that "conclusions and opinions which are
outside the area of the ultimate question may be admitted .... Id. at 805.
72 Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York v. Frank, 227 F. Supp. 948 (D. Conn.
1964). The court found that its previous test "has proven to be more confusing
than helpful .... " Id. at 949.
7.4 Id. The court stated:
At the time of the former ruling, without the actual investigative
group reports and exhibits before it, the court envisaged an area of
conclusion and opinion evidence which would be admissible under
some rule of evidence and which would not tend to bear upon how
the crash occurred. A more workable and better rule is entirely to
exclude all evaluation, opinion and conclusion evidence.
ld.
74 American Airlines, 418 F.2d at 195-96.
75 Id. at 196. The court stated: "In the context of this case it would perhaps be
suitable to say that the attempt to derive information about the altitude, speed,
heading, and vertical acceleration of [the flight] was a factual inquiry. However, a
very sophisticated evaluation of the data had to be made." Id.
- Id. The court held that "[b]ecause of the uncertainty which the Frank rule
would introduce in sorting fact from opinion, it would be better to exclude opin-
ion testimony only when it embraces the probable cause of the accident or the
negligence of the defendant." Id.
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dicate the difficulty common law trial judges experienced
in resolving the admissibility of public investigatory
records. Different courts defined fact and opinion in dif-
ferent degrees. Although the difficulty in making such a
distinction plagued the admissibility question, the crea-
tion of the Federal Rules of Evidence merely furthered
the confusion.
III. RECOGNITION OF THE PUBLIC REPORTS EXCEPTION
TO THE HEARSAY DOCTRINE IN THE FEDERAL
RULES OF EVIDENCE
In January of 1975, Congress passed legislation to en-
act the Federal Rules of Evidence for use in the United
States federal courts.77 The Federal Rules redefined and
codified the hearsay doctrine 7 and the exceptions to that
doctrine.79 The Advisory Committee on Proposed Rules
("Advisory Committee") drafted Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 803(8) to recognize the common law exception for
public records and reports.80 Three types of official
records are recognized in Rule 803(8): subsection A cov-
ers the activities of an office or agency; subsection B cov-
ers reports completed pursuant to a legal duty to observe;
and subsection C covers factual findings from an investi-
77 Act ofJan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926, reprinted in 1974 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 7051.
7A FED. R. EvID. 801, 802. Rule 801 provides in part:
Rule 801. Definitions
The following definitions apply in this article: (a) Statement. A
"statement" is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal con-
duct of a person, if it is intended by the person as an assertion.
(b) Declarant. A "declarant" is a person who makes a statement.
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by the
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence
to prove the truth of the matter asserted.
FED. R. EvID. 801. Rule 802 provides:
Rule 802. Hearsay Rule
Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these rules or by
other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory
authority or by Act of Congress.
FED. R. EvID. 802.
79 FED. R. EvID. 803, 804.
- FED. R. EVID. 803(8) advisory committee's note.
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gation made pursuant to law. 81 This comment focuses on
the appropriate scope of admissibility within the language
of subsection C. 2
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8)(C) developed from the
common law rationale for the admission of certain public
reports. The recognition that government officers should
not be forced to spend inordinate amounts of time testify-
ing at trial underlies the exception.83 More importantly,
the drafters of the rules assumed that public investigatory
reports are completed in a reliable fashion.84 Because of
this focus on the reliability of the record maker, the draft-
ers included a provision requiring that the circumstances
and source of information be trustworthy.85 The inclu-
sion of the trustworthiness safeguard allowed the drafters
to assume admissibility unless reliability could not be
shown.86 The Advisory Committee recommended four
factors to assist courts in determining the admissibility of
evaluative reports: (1) whether the investigation is timely;
(2) whether the official conducting the investigation has
special skill or experience; (3) whether a hearing was held;
and (4) whether motivation problems existed.87
8' See supra note 15 for the text of Rule 803(8).
S2 A portion of 803(8) (C) limits the applicability of the section in criminal cases.
The hearsay exception in subsection C applies only to use against the government
in criminal cases because of the concern for the constitutional confrontation
clause rights that must be afforded individuals in criminal proceedings. See supra
note 15 for the language of this qualification. This comment does not explore
further the material that has developed in interpreting Rule 803(8)(C) in criminal
matters.
$1 See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
FED. R. EvID. 803(8) advisory committee's note ("Justification for the excep-
tion is the assumption that a public official will perform his duty properly and the
unlikelihood that he will remember details independently of the record.").
'5 See supra note 15 and accompanying text for the exact language of the "trust-
worthiness" clause; see infra notes 163-186 and accompanying text for analysis of
decisions defining the clause.
- FED. R. EVID. 803(8) advisory committee's note. The Committee explained
that the rule "assumes admissibility in the first instance but with ample provision
for escape if sufficient negative factors are present." Id.
7 FED. R. EvID. 803(8) advisory committee's note. As to the timeliness of the
investigation, and the special skill or experience of the official, the Committee
referenced Professor McCormick's arguments for admission of evaluative reports:
The most important reason is time. The officer comes on the scene
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The Advisory Committee drafting Rule 803(8)(C) left
courts with a difficult problem in the implementation of
the Rule. The problem relates to the construction of the
language "factual findings resulting from an investigation
made pursuant to authority granted by law.... 88 The
Advisory Committee did not define what the phrase "fac-
tual findings" was to include. The Committee acknowl-
edged that the admission of evaluative materials had
generated problems for the courts.8 9 However, the Advi-
sory Committee recognized that Congress was previously
willing to pass federal statutes admitting certain evalua-
usually as early as it is feasible to get there .... The officer is often
able to interview witnesses before they have been pulled one way or
the other by the parties. The officer, too, is frequently a specialist -
a doctor reporting death, a fire marshal investigating a fire - or at
least experienced in like investigations, such as highway patrolman
reporting a collision.
McCormick, Can the Courts Make Wider Use of Reports of Official Investigations?, 42
IowA L. REV. 363, 364-65 (1957). In reference to whether a hearing was held and
the level at which it was conducted, the Committee cited Franklin v. Skelly Oil
Co., 141 F.2d 568 (10th Cir. 1944). For a discussion of Franklin, see supra notes
49-52 and accompanying text. The Committee's fourth factor was possible moti-
vation problems suggested by Palmer v. Hoffman, 38 U.S. 109 (1943) (upholding
the inadmissibility of an accident report offered by the defendant railroad because
a locomotive engineer personally involved in the accident prepared the report and
would certainly have been affected by a desire to exculpate himself).
8" FED. R. EvID. 803(8)(C); see supra note 15 for the complete text of the Rule.
In Fraley v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 470 F. Supp. 1264, 1266 (S.D. Ohio 1979), the
court determined that the language "pursuant to authority granted by law" did
not mean necessarily required by law:
Although Rockwell [defendant] argues that the investigation must
be required by law, the language of Rule 803(8) suggests otherwise.
Section "B" of Rule 803(8), which does require that the underlying
investigation be required by law, uses the language "as to which
matters there was a duty to report..." to convey this message. By
contrast, Section "C" of Rule 803(8) provides that the investigation
need only be "made pursuant to authority granted by law." It would
seem that the drafters of the rule would have used identical language
in both Sections if investigations covered under Section "C" had to
be required by law, rather than merely permitted by it.
Fraley, 470 F. Supp. at 1266.
- FED. R. EVID. 803(8) advisory committee's note ("The more controversial
area of public records is that of the so-called 'evaluative' report. The disagree-
ment among the decisions has been due in part, no doubt, to the variety of situa-
tions encountered, as well as to differences in principle.").
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tive reports. ° That willingness was an indication to the
Advisory Committee that Congress supported the admis-
sion of evaluative reports within Section C.9'
The Advisory Committee's reading of a consistent Con-
gressional intent proved to be incorrect. The scope of the
"factual findings" clause of Rule 803(8)(C) was a subject
of controversy in the House and Senate Judiciary Com-
mittees. The House of Representatives Judiciary Com-
mittee recommended that the rule be strictly read to
exclude evaluations or opinions contained in reports.92
The Senate Judiciary Committee's Report disagreed with
the House version, contending that the House did not un-
derstand the Advisory Committee's intended operation of
the Rule.93  The Senate Report concluded that the lan-
m FED. R. EVID. 803(8) advisory committee's note. The Committee
determined:
Various kinds of evaluative reports are admissible under federal stat-
utes: 7 U.S.C. § 210(0, findings of Secretary of Agriculture prima
facie evidence in action for damages against stockyard owner; 7
U.S.C. § 292, order by Secretary of Agriculture prima facie evidence
in judicial enforcement proceedings against producers association
monopoly; 7 U.S.C. § 1622(h), Department of Agriculture inspec-
tion certificates of products shipped in interstate commerce prima
facie evidence; 8 U.S.C. § 1440(c), separation of alien from military
service on conditions other than honorable provable by certificate
from department in proceedings to revoke citizenship; 18 U.S.C.
§ 4245, certificate of Director of Prisons that convicted person has
been examined and found probably incompetent at time of trial
prima facie evidence in court hearing on competency; 42 U.S.C.
§ 269(b), bill of health by appropriate official prima facie evidence of
vessel's sanitary history and condition and compliance with regula-
tions; 46 U.S.C. § 679, certificate of consul presumptive evidence of
refusal of master to transport destitute seamen to United States.
Id.
FED. R. EVID. 803(8) advisory committee's note ("[Tihe willingness of Con-
gress to recognize a substantial measure of admissibility for evaluative reports is a
helpful guide.").
,,- H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 14, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 7075, 7088 ("The committee intends that the phrase 'fac-
tual findings' be strictly construed and that evaluations or opinions contained in
public reports shall not be admissible under this Rule.").
1., S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 18, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 7051, 7064. In reference to the House Judiciary Committee's
version the Senate Committee wrote:
The committee takes strong exception to this limiting understanding
of the application of the rule. We do not think it reflects an under-
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guage of the Rule, combined with the Advisory Commit-
tee information, provided sufficient guidance on the
admissibility of the evaluative reports.9 4 The Joint Con-
ference Committee Report did not resolve the conflict.95
The legislative history of Rule 803(8)(C), therefore, pro-
vides two contrary interpretations. As a result, courts de-
veloped alternative constructions of Rule 803(8)(C).
The version of Rule 803(8)(C) passed by Congress in-
cluded the basic two-part inquiry envisioned by the Advi-
sory Committee. The first portion of the standard
requires courts to determine whether the record in ques-
tion is a "factual finding resulting from an investigation
made pursuant to law." If a court determines the record
in question meets this requirement, it then must imple-
ment the second inquiry as to whether the record was
completed in a trustworthy fashion. The federal courts
have taken distinctly different approaches to resolving the
first "factual findings" inquiry. Although there is a split
of authority on that clause of the Rule, courts have been
more consistent in applying the Advisory Committee fac-
tors to resolve the trustworthiness inquiry.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION OF RULE 803(8)(C) IN THE
FEDERAL COURTS
A. The Strict Construction of "Factual Findings"
Many federal courts interpreted the phrase "factual
findings" consistently with the House of Representatives
approach to the Rule by interpreting the phrase to have a
standing of the intended operation of the rule as explained in the
Advisory Committee notes to this subsection .... We think the re-
strictive interpretation of the House overlooks the fact that while the
Advisory Committee assumes admissibility in the first instance of
evaluative reports, they are not admissible if, as the rule states, "the
sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of
trustworthiness."
1974 U.S. CODE & ADMIN. NEWS at 7064.
o, Id. at 7065.
115 CONF. REP. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 18, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 7098, 7104-05.
plain meaning. Courts that adhere to this plain meaning
approach persist in the attempt to distinguish fact from
opinion. A minority of the circuits adopted this interpre-
tation of Rule 803(8)(C).
One of the early decisions limiting the scope of Rule
803(8)(C) to its plain meaning concerned a suit arising
out of a collision between two ships in the New York har-
bor. In Complaint of American Export Lines Inc. ,96 the court
excluded the evaluative conclusions and opinions con-
tained in a Coast Guard report as well as the entire con-
tents of a National Transportation Safety Board report
regarding the incident.97 The court was troubled by the
conflicting legislative history and found direction in the
language of Federal Rule 803(6).98 The court noted that
the business records exception in 803(6) allows admission
of "opinions" and "diagnoses," whereas 803(8)(C) specif-
ically omits those terms.99 The court assumed that be-
cause the drafters used different terms in similar contexts,
the drafters intended different meanings.100 The court
also recognized that the statute mandating the Coast
Guard and NTSB reports stipulated that such reports
were not to be used in litigation. The court held this to be
73 F.R.D. 454 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
97 Id. at 456.
i' Id. at 457. The pertinent portion of Rule 803(6) states:
Rule 803. Hearsay Exceptions; Availability of Declarant Immaterial
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though
the declarant is available as a witness: . . .(6) Records of regularly
conducted activity. A memorandum, report, record, or data compi-
lation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions, .or diagno-
ses, made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by,
a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly con-
ducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that
business activity to make the memorandum, report, record, or data
compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other
qualified witness, unless the source of information or the method or
circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness.
FED. R. EvID. 803(6).
American Export, 73 F.R.D. at 457.
Id. ("Rule 803(8) which is similar in many respects to Rule 803(6), omits
['opinions' and 'diagnoses'] and substitutes 'factual findings.' Since these differ-
ent terms are used in separate but similar contexts within the same rule, the Court
will assume that they have separate and distinct meanings.").
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the type of negative factor that weighed against admitting
conclusions and opinions stated in the reports.''
In Smith v. Ithaca Corp.,"02 the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit adopted the strict analysis employed in Ameri-
can Export. The Smith case represents the basis for the
Eleventh Circuit's treatment of the JAG Report in Rainey
1.0I3 In Smith, the spouse of a seaman who died of a heart
attack brought suit against the maker of the ship, claiming
improper exposure to benzene fumes. After the merchant
seaman's death, the ship exploded and the Coast Guard
investigated the disaster."0 4 Although the Coast Guard in-
vestigation focused on the explosion, it also included con-
clusions concerning the benzene contamination aboard
ship. 10 5 Relying completely on the comparison to Rule
803(6) set out in American Export,10 6 the Fifth Circuit held
the findings of fact admissible, but excluded the evalua-
tive conclusions and opinions of the Coast Guard investi-
gative board. 0 7
The Fifth Circuit continued to read Rule 803(8)(C) nar-
rowly in McQuaig v. McCoy. I08 After being arrested for
suspicion of driving while intoxicated, Jacque McQuaig
brought suit for false arrest against Louisiana State Police
Id. at 457-59.
1"12 612 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1980).
1- See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Rainey I
court's reliance on Smith.
1..4 Smith, 612 F.2d at 217-20.
'"= Id. at 223 n.20. The Coast Guard investigation found:
[T]he crewmembers on [the ship] were repeatedly exposed to ben-
zene vapors in harmful concentrations. Exposure was caused by
fumes emitted from several sources while washing and gas freeing
cargo tanks. Exposure also occurred when fumes were emitted from
vents and open ullage openings while loading ballast or cargo ....
[I]t is concluded that there is a need for an amendment to the tank
vessel regulations which would correct this apparent deficiency and
which would control this source of noxious fumes.
Id.
1,4 Id. at 221-22.
1',7 Id. at 222. The court excluded "opinions as to liability, conclusions as to
cause of the [ship's] sinking, or recommendations regarding how to avoid similar
disasters in the future." Id.
1- 806 F.2d 1298 (5th Cir. 1987).
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department officer George McCoy. The Internal Affairs
division of the state police issued a report concerning the
arrest that contained evaluative opinions and conclusions
regarding McCoy's conduct.'0 9 The circuit court, ex-
pressly relying on Smith, upheld the lower court's denial
of admission for the conclusory parts of the report." 0
Courts have similarly restricted the admission of gov-
ernment evaluative reports in the area of medical re-
search. In Wetherill v. University of Chicago,"' Rachel
Wetherill brought suit for injuries allegedly resulting
from her mother's ingestion of the drug diethylstilbestrol
(DES). Wetherill sought to introduce a 1978 Department
of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) report on the
effects of DES into evidence." 2 The court found that the
report was not composed of "factual findings," but rather,
consisted of assessments of the literature and of personal
opinions of the report's authors." 3
A government report concerning medical research was
also the focus of a narrow reading of Rule 803(8)(C) by
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. In Lindsay v.
Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.,"' the court distinguished facts
from medical opinions. The Food and Drug Administra-
,,,, Id. at 1300 ("[Tlhe report concluded with the investigators' opinions of Mc-
Coy's actions. In the investigators' view, McCoy was capricious and prejudicial in
his arrest of McQuaig, but they could not totally substantiate the allegation of
'false arrest' and therefore did not sustain it.").
," Id. at 1302. The Fifth Circuit panel recognized that other circuits decide the
admissibility question differently:
Some circuits have followed [the narrow] position, while others have
not. Although the McQuaigs argue we should adopt a contrary posi-
tion to this circuit's present policy, the law in this circuit is settled,
and until overruled by this circuit en banc, or by the Supreme Court,
we are compelled to follow it. (citations omitted).
Id. at 1302 n.4.
ill 518 F. Supp. 1387 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
112 Id. at 1388-89. The Secretary of HEW directed the Surgeon General to ap-
point a task force to study and review the available information on DES and to
make specific recommendations regarding further research. Id. at 1388.
11 Id. at 1390. Although the court felt that Rule 803(8)(C) should be given an
expansive reading, it determined that "[n]o court has permitted the introduction
of a survey of existing data such as contained in the Report." Id.
114 637 F.2d 87 (2d Cir. 1980).
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tion (FDA) had required certain labeling changes for oral
contraceptives. The court held that a record of the FDA's
requirement reflected opinions that should not have been
admissible in an action for damages allegedly resulting
from the use of the pills.' " 5 In so holding the Second Cir-
cuit relied upon Smith and the narrow pre-Federal Rules
decision in Franklin v. Skelly Oil Co. 116
Another case in which the court distinguished fact from
opinion in government medical research is Marsee v.
United States Tobacco Co. " 7 In Marsee, the plaintiff brought
suit against a tobacco snuff products manufacturer after
contracting oral cancer. The court rejected Marsee's at-
tempts to have certain government research reports re-
garding the causation of cancer admitted into evidence."'
Several courts determined that public reports com-
pleted by a congressional oversight committee are inad-
missible. In Bright v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co.,' 1' 9 the
Sixth Circuit heard a suit brought by the representatives
of three men killed in a car accident. The Eleventh Cir-
cuit heard a similar case in Baker v. Firestone Tire and Rubber
Co. 120 In both cases the plaintiffs wanted the results of a
House of Representatives Subcommittee investigation of
the Firestone 500 tire admitted into evidence.' 2' The
115 Id. at 94.
1", Id.; see supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text for a discussion of Franklin.
,,7 639 F. Supp. 466 (W.D. Okla. 1986).
'IN Id. at 470. The court rejected both the Report of the International Agency
for Research on Cancer (IARC) and the Report of the Consensus Development
Conference of the National Institute of Health (CDC). The court held "[t]he re-
ports represent little more than opinions and conclusions drawn from existing
research literature casting doubt upon the trustworthiness of the reports for the
purposes of Rule 803(8)(C)." Id. The court did admit a Report of the Surgeon
General's Advisory Committee differentiating it as an "authoritative, exhaustive
study by a public agency pursuant to law." Id.
756 F.2d 19 (6th Cir. 1984).
793 F.2d 1196 (11 th Cir. 1986); see infra notes 183-186 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the trustworthiness problem associated with Congressional
reports.
Bright, 756 F.2d at 22. The court also recognized:
The portions of the report read into the record are generally find-
ings and conclusions regarding the safety record of the Firestone
500 drawn from empirical evidence regarding numbers of accidents,
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courts denied admission because the report was com-
prised mostly of the committee's opinions regarding Fire-
stone's culpability. 22
The District of Columbia District Court confronted the
admissibility question with the reports of both a Congres-
sional committee and a regulatory agency. In United States
v. American Telephone & Telegraph,' 23 the court considered
the admissibility of voluminous materials and documents
from the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in
a telephone antitrust action. The court recognized that
the records of government rule making proceedings pre-
sent a complicated problem for analysis under Rule
803(8)(C). 24 The court admitted the FCC's findings of
fact, the FCC's review of American Telephone and Tele-
graph (AT&T) analysis, and the FCC's summaries of back-
ground material. 125 The court, however, did not admit
FCC conclusions on whether AT&T met the burden of
proof of compliance with the Communications Act.'
26
The court also did not admit the FCC findings that mixed
lawsuits, and customer complaints requiring adjustment. The report
extract relied heavily on data regarding the tire's adjustment ratio,
or frequency of consumer complaints, and concluded that the 500
"stands alone as a problem tire."
Id.; see also Baker, 793 F.2d at 1199.
"-- Baker, 793 F.2d at 1199 ("The subcommittee report did not contain the fac-
tual findings necessary to an objective investigation, but consisted of the rather
heated conclusions of a politically motivated hearing."); Bright, 756 F.2d at 22
("Much of the proffered evidence comprises the Committee's subjective conclu-
sions regarding Firestone's culpability, rather than factual findings.").
12:. 498 F. Supp. 353 (D.D.C. 1980).
124 Id. at 360. The court distinguished the findings of a rule making proceeding
focused on future conduct which is inadmissible, from the findings of an adjudica-
tory proceeding regarding past conduct which is admissible. Id. However, the
court noted:
The difficulty is that with respect to the great bulk of the test case
materials it is impossible to draw a hard-and-fast distinction between
rule-making and fact-oriented adjudication. The materials typically
mix both elements; they involve the prescription of future behavior
through order or rule, but at the same time they contain findings of
fact made by the Commission (or an administrative law judge) upon
which the issuance of rulings for the future is based.
Id. at 361.
Id. at 361-62.
Id. at 362-63. The court believed that the FCC conclusions that AT&T had
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fact, law and policy.' 27
The District of Columbia court faced the question of
admissibility of a report of the Subcommittee on Crime of
the House Judiciary Committee ("Subcommittee") in
Pearce v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc. 128 The plaintiff in Pearce,
an employee of E.F. Hutton, sought to admit the Subcom-
mittee's report in a libel action against his employer.12 9
The court distinguished the findings of the Subcommittee
report from the FCC reports that had been given limited
admissibility in AT&T.' 30  The court concluded that the
Subcommittee's role was more evaluative than investiga-
tive. 13 ' Because the authority of the Subcommittee de-
not met the burden of proof necessary to justify a particular practice did not mean
the FCC determined the existence or non-existence of facts:
Rather, they reflect conclusions by the Commission that the record
in a particular docket yielded no definitive answers, and that because
the burden was on AT&T to produce these answers it could not pre-
vail. The inclusion of such conclusions within the category of "fac-
tual findings resulting from an investigation" of Rule 803(8)(C)
would stretch that hearsay exception beyond the bounds of its previ-
ous applications, especially if the materials were introduced to prove
the non-existence of the particular state of affairs which AT&T did
not meet its burden of proving.
ld.
._,7 Id. at 363. The court recognized that "[it would be difficult, if not impossi-
ble, to separate out with respect to these materials those elements that would
qualify as "factual findings" from those that are primarily conjectures by the FCC
as to how the future will or should unfold." Id.; see also John McShain, Inc. v.
Cessna Aircraft, 563 F.2d 632, 636 (3d Cir. 1977) (The Third Circuit upheld the
trial judge's exclusion of the accident reports because use of the National Trans-
portation Safety Board reports would require a lengthy attempt to sift out
hearsay.).
'' 653 F. Supp. 810 (D.D.C. 1987). The Subcommittee had investigated the
Justice Department's decision not to prosecute E.F. Hutton executives even
though E.F. Hutton pled guilty to two thousand counts of mail and wire fraud. Id.
at 810-13.
12 Id. at 812. E.F. Hutton hired a law firm to do its own investigation of the
events leading to the mail and wire fraud charges. The report of that investiga-
tion, entitled "The Hutton Report," named the plaintiff and several other individ-
uals as being responsible for the fraudulent practices. Id. at 811-12.
1: Id. at 813-14. The court recognized that the Draft Report of the Subcom-
mittee undertook only to understand what Hutton had done and the Justice De-
partment's response. The court referred to the Draft Report as consisting of "the
Subcommittee's subjective comments, criticisms, arguments, and evaluations ....
Nowhere was an attempt made to set forth separate factual findings." Id. at 813.
-1 Id. The court explained that "[tihe subcommittee, in furtherance of its over-
sight responsibility over the Department [ofJustice], undertook to understand the
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rived from its oversight function rather than an
investigative function, the Subcommittee's report was
inadmissible. 3 2
This brief survey of different cases advocating a narrow
reading of Rule 803(8) (C) indicates the wide range of cir-
cumstances in which courts have chosen to draw a
fact/opinion line. The difficulty with this approach is that
in each instance the trial court has made a determination
without any guidelines from either the Rule itself or the
Advisory Committee Notes. Thus, there is no uniform
standard upon which the federal courts can consistently
differentiate opinion from fact. The result is a scope of
admissibility based on the personal ideas of individual
judges. Although there are many instances in which the
difference in fact and opinion may be clear, a'vast range of
material contained in public records can be interpreted as
either fact or opinion. The narrow approach to Rule
803(8)(C) does not resolve the admissibility question for
these instances.
B. The Broad Construction of "Factual Findings"
Many courts have not followed the restrictive interpre-
tation that developed out of the House interpretation of
Rule 803(8)(C), but rather have read the legislative his-
tory to encompass admissibility of evaluative conclusions
and opinions. Instead of focusing on the two words "fac-
tual findings," these courts have found a broader purpose
in the complete phrase, "factual findings resulting from
an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by
law." This view of broader admissibility under Rule
803(8)(C) stems out of Senate and Advisory Committee
scheme perpetrated by Hutton and to thus evaluate the conclusions reached, and
actions taken, by the Department." Id. (emphasis added).
112 Id. at 814. The court explained that "[tihe instant case does not deal with an
adjudicatory proceeding nor even with an investigation whose stated purpose was
the resolution of some factual dispute." Id.; see infra notes 183-186 and accompa-
nying text for a discussion of the trustworthiness problem with Congressional
reports.
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interpretations and has been adopted in the majority of
the circuits.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit initially dis-
tinguished fact from opinion in Lloyd v. American Export
Lines, Inc. '33 In Lloyd, the court admitted the Decision and
Order of a Coast Guard hearing examiner. The Decision
and Order of the hearing examiner set forth the results of
his investigation into the circumstances of a fight aboard a
ship owned by the defendant.134 The Lloyd court, how-
ever, admitted the hearing examiner's summation of the
evidence as a factual finding not including opinions.' 35
Soon after the Lloyd decision the Third Circuit adopted
a broader admissibility reading in Melville v. American Home
Assurance Co. 136 Melville was a suit to collect on an insur-
ance policy for accidental death in an airplane crash. The
court held that the Airworthiness Directives issued by the
FAA were admissible under Rule 803(8)(C) to show the
crash was an accident rather than suicide.' 37 The court
based its determination on the Advisory Committee's ap-
proach which assumes admissibility unless negative fac-
tors are present. 38
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit rendered
..... 580 F.2d 1179 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 969 (1978).
'A Id. at 1182-83. The court determined that the hearing examiner's summa-
tion of the evidence and comments on inconsistencies therein did not make the
Coast Guard Report inadmissible. Id. at 1183.
1.n Id. ("We reject appellee's contention that the Coast Guard Decision and
Order consists in large part of the opinions of the hearing examiner and thus fails
to meet the 'factual findings' requirement of the Rule.").
':w 584 F.2d 1306 (3d Cir. 1978).
,37 Id. at 1315-16. The court relied on the Advisory Committee notes empha-
sizing admissibility in the first instance unless evidence of a lack of trustworthiness
is shown. See supra note 15 and accompanying text for the language of the rule; see
infra notes 163-186 and accompanying text for a discussion of the trustworthiness
provision of Rule 803(8)(C).
Melville, 584 F.2d at 1316. The Third Circuit found that
[tihe district court judge followed the Advisory Committee's Note in
concluding that the Airworthiness Directives were admissible under
Rule 803(8)(C) even though they contained evaluative materials. In
our opinion the trial judge was correct in this determination since
the proviso to Rule 803(8)(C) permits exclusion of such reports if
evidence of lack of trustworthiness is introduced (footnote omitted).
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one of the broadest readings of Rule 803(8)(C) in Baker v.
Elcona Homes Corp. '39 The case involved a personal injury
action arising out of a right angle collision between a
truck owned by defendants and the plaintiffs automobile.
The court upheld admission of a police officer's report of
the incident that concluded the plaintiff entered the inter-
section against the red light, failed to yield the right of
way, and was preoccupied. 40 The court based its decision
on the trustworthiness factors suggested by the Advisory
Committee to the Federal Rules.' 4 1
The Sixth Circuit also determined that an administra-
tive finding of a lack of negligence may be admitted under
Rule 803(8)(C). In Complaint of Paducah Towing Co. ,142 the
court upheld the admission of the findings of an adminis-
trative law judge at a license revocation hearing concern-
ing the reasonableness of the actions of a tow boat
captain. 43 The court determined a previous finding that
an action is reasonable is an inference drawn from histori-
cal facts and is therefore admissible under the Rule
803(8)(C) exception. 44
Courts have also read the "factual findings" clause
588 F.2d 551 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 993 (1979).
Id. at 555-56. The Sixth Circuit relied on United States v. School District of
Ferndale, Michigan, 577 F.2d 1339 (6th Cir. 1978), a school desegregation suit in
which the court held it a reversible error to exclude the findings of an HEW hear-
ing examiner that a school had been established and maintained as a black school
for segregative purposes. The court stated: "[c]learly, the HEW proceedings
were an 'investigation' into the state of affairs in the Ferndale schools within the
plain meaning of that word." Ferndale, 577 F.2d at 1354. After recognizing this
precedent, the Elcona Homes court stated that the police officer's determination of
whether the light was red or green was more clearly a factual finding under the
Rule than was the HEW hearing in Ferndale. Elcona Homes, 588 F.2d at 557.
, Elcona Homes, 588 F.2d at 558; Cf Dallas & Mavis Forwarding Co. v. Stegall,
659 F.2d 721 (6th Cir. 1981) (holding that the state trooper's investigation of a
car-truck accident was not admissible because it was based on no physical evi-
dence and was derived primarily from the story of a party witness); see supra note
87 and accompanying text for the listing of the Advisory Committee factors.
,42 692 F.2d 412 (6th Cir. 1982).
14:1 Id. at 420. The court recognized that "[a]lthough a finding that actions were
reasonable is somewhat conclusory, we do not believe that such a label is control-
ling. In our view, a finding that amounts to an inference drawn from subsidiary
findings is admissible under Rule 803(8)(C)." Id.
144 Id.
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broadly with respect to the admissibility of formal deci-
sions of an administrative agency. The District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania made several eviden-
tiary rulings under Rule 803(8)(C) in the complicated an-
titrust case Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial
Co. 145 Although the court focused its denial of admissibil-
ity on the trustworthiness factors, 14 6 the court provided a
broad reading of the inclusive nature of the "factual find-
ings" clause. 147 The court distinguished between situa-
tions in which a staff report makes conclusions based on
the evidence before it, and situations in which a commis-
sion or public agency adopts a staff report and then makes
formal findings.148 The Second Circuit did not make such
a distinction in Litton Systems, Inc. v. American Telephone &
Telegraph Co. , 4 9 where the court affirmed admission of
various FCC formal decisions that described actions with
145 505 F. Supp. 1125 (E.D. Pa. 1980), aj'd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. In re
Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd on other
grounds, 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
146 Zenith, 505 F. Supp. at 1148; see infra notes 179-182 and accompanying text
for an explanation of the court's trustworthiness analysis.
,,7 Zenith, 505 F. Supp. at 1143-46. The court explained that:
The language of 803(8) (C) literally provides for the admission of en-
tire agency reports so long as those reports include, inter alia, factual
findings ... [Black's Law Dictionary definitions of finding] comport
with the common sense meaning of "finding" and support the view
that a finding does not include legal conclusions that may have been
reached by an investigator and is necessarily something more than a
mere recitation of evidence, although we think the term is broad
enough to encompass any statement of fact that represents a conclu-
sion on the part of the investigator and that such factual statements
need not be formally "findings" in order to come under 803(8)(C).
Id. at 1143-44.
14K Id. at 1145. The court held:
[W]here a staff report contains factual averments that are not mere
recitations of evidence, but rather reflect conclusions made by the
staff on the basis of evidence before it, those averments may be ad-
mitted as 803(8)(C) "findings." Where, however, the staff report is
submitted to a commission or other public agency charged with
making formal findings, only those factual statements from the staff
reports that are approved and adopted by the agency will qualify as
803(8)(C) "findings."
Id.
W, 700 F.2d 785 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1073 (1984) (antitrust suit
by seller of telephone terminal equipment against telephone company).
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adjective terms. 150
The Fourth and Eighth Circuits have read Rule
803(8)(C) broadly in cases involving the admissibility of
factual findings that result from a formal scientific study
completed by a governmental agency. In suits brought by
administrators of the victims of Toxic Shock Syndrome
(TSS) against the manufacturers of tampons, the circuits
faced the questions of admissibility of epidemiological
studies performed by the Center for Disease Control
(CDC) and by state agencies.1 5 1 The courts admitted the
studies even though they contained tentative conclu-
sions.1 52 The rationale behind the court's decisions was
the similarity between the scientific studies and other
agency reports that courts previously found admissible.
153
... Id. at 818. The court admitted into evidence FCC formal decisions that
decribed AT&T's interface tariffs as "unnecessarily restrictive" and an "unjust
and unreasonable discrimination." Id. The court distinguished the findings of
the FCC from its own earlier decision in City of New York v. Pullman Inc., 662
F.2d 910, 914 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1164 (1982), in which the in-
terim staff report of a government agency was excluded because it was not the
final report or finding of a government agency. Litton, 700 F.2d at 818 n.45.
151 See Ellis v. International Playtex Inc., 745 F.2d 292 (4th Cir. 1984); Kehm v.
Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 724 F.2d 613 (8th Cir. 1983). TSS was first discov-
ered in 1978, and the federal government instituted the CDC studies in the spring
of 1980. Those studies consisted of tables, graphs and charts summarizing the
results of observations of TSS victims. The research confirmed a correlation be-
tween the use of tampons, menstruation and TSS. The state health departments
of Wisconsin, Minnesota and Iowa also implemented a study dubbed the Tri-State
Study at approximately the same time. The research was summarized in a report
to the Food and Drug Administration in early 1981. Ellis, 745 F.2d at 297; see also
Wolf v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 555 F. Supp. 613, 625 (D.N.J. 1982) ("[Sltudies
conducted by the CDC and state health departments come under the public
records exception to the hearsay rule as set forth in [Rule]803(8)(C).").
152 See Ellis, 745 F.2d at 301. The court determined that 803(8)(C) should be
interpreted broadly. "Thus, the fact that the CDC and Tri-State studies contained
tentative conclusions as well as statistical findings does not affect the applicability
of the rule." Id.; see also Kehm, 724 F.2d at 618.
15.. See Ellis, 745 F.2d at 300-01. The court explained:
Most government sponsored investigations employ well accepted
methodological means of gathering and analyzing data.... We do
not believe scientific reports should be treated any differently from
other public findings of fact under a Fed. R. Evid. 803(8)(C) analysis.
Indeed, in this instance the rationale behind the rule argues strongly
for admission of the contested studies. First, both studies were car-
ried out by public offices "pursuant to authority granted by law."
The CDC is a branch of the United States Department of Health and
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Another area in which courts have given an expansive
reading to Rule 803(8) (C) is Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission (EEOC) findings of reasonable cause in
Title VII actions. In Chandler v. Roudebush,154 the Supreme
Court noted that administrative findings regarding claims
of discrimination are generally admissible under Rule
803(8)(C).1 55  The Seventh and Eighth Circuits adopted
this language in Tulloss v. Near North Montessori School' 56
and Johnson v. Yellow Freight System, Inc. 157 In both cases
the EEOC had investigated discrimination claims and is-
sued findings that reasonable cause existed to believe dis-
crimination had taken place. 5 8 The courts reiterated the
general statement of admissibility from Chandler, but
stressed that the decision remains in the discretion of the
trialjudge.'5 9 The importance of this series of cases, how-
ever, is in the general holding that EEOC conclusions are
admissible under Rule 803(8)(C). This holding is another
indication of the circuits' expansive reading of Rule
803(8)(C).
The Tenth Circuit gave a broad interpretation to Rule
Human Services, and the Tri-State study was conducted by members
of the Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Iowa Departments of Health.
Both studies consist of "data compilations ...setting forth factual
findings ...."
Id. at 301 (footnote omitted); see also Kehm, 724 F.2d at 618. The court found that
"courts construing the term 'factual findings' in Rule 803(8)(C) have given it
broad scope. They have often admitted government reports setting forth agency
opinions and conclusions on the ground that such reports, because they are pub-
lic records based on investigations conducted pursuant to lawful authority, are
presumptively reliable." Id. (citations omitted); see also In re Agent Orange Prod.
Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), af'd, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2898 (1988) (the court adopted the analysis regarding epide-
miological studies in Ellis and Kehm to determine that similar methodology with
respect to Agent Orange research would be admissible under Rule 803(8)(C)).
14 425 U.S. 840 (1976).
155 Id. at 863 n.39.
15, 776 F.2d 150 (7th Cir. 1985).
157 734 F.2d 1304 (8th Cir. 1984).
14- In Tulloss, a Philippine born teacher claimed discrimination for her dismissal
as a teacher. Tulloss, 776 F.2d at 152. In Johnson, a black man claimed his dis-
charge from employment with Yellow Freight Systems, Inc. resulted from racial
discrimination. Johnson, 734 F.2d at 1306.
1-m Tulloss, 776 F.2d at 150;Johnson, 734 F.2d at 1304.
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803(8)(C) in admitting conclusory statements in the re-
port of a police review board. In Perrin v. Anderson, 160 the
administrator of the estate of a shooting victim brought
suit against the officers involved. The Oklahoma Depart-
ment of Public Safety appointed five of its members to in-
vestigate the shooting.' 6I The court held that even
though the Shooting Report contained conclusions con-
cerning the propriety of the officers' conduct, it was
admissible. 162
The majority of the federal courts of appeal have fol-
lowed a broad reading of the factual findings phrase. The
vastly different circumstances under which courts have ad-
mitted opinion and conclusory materials indicate the ef-
fectiveness a broad interpretation of Rule 803(8)(C) can
provide. The broad approach is effective because it
reduces the necessity to engage in an additional
fact/opinion analysis. If a court finds the record to be of a
government investigation based on factual findings, ad-
missibility is assumed.
C. The Trustworthiness Clause
The application of Rule 803(8)(C) involves more than a
mere consideration of whether the public records or re-
ports consist of "factual findings." Even if the court de-
termines that the records of the public office or agency set
forth "factual findings," admissibility under the exception
still hinges on whether the sources of information were
trustworthy. The Advisory Committee indicated that ad-
missibility should be assumed unless sufficient negative
factors are present.' 63 The negative factor to be guarded
.. 784 F.2d 1040 (10th Cir. 1986).
wt Id. at 1046. The Shooting Review Board interviewed defendants and their
superior officers to reach its conclusions. Id.
.2 Id. at 1046-47. The report concluded that: "There was no doubt that [the
officers] acted within the guidelines set forth in the Policies and Procedures Man-
ual." Id. at 1046.
1w: FED. R. EvID 803(8) advisory committee's note. The Committee referred to
its own earlier explanation of trustworthiness in the note following Rule 803(6),
which states that "the rule proceeds from the base that records made in the course
of a regularly conducted activity will be taken as admissible but subject to author-
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against is lack of trustworthy, reliable information.
The actual determination of a report's trustworthiness
is based on several interrelated factors. One court has
noted that trustworthiness is not confirmed by an analysis
of the content of records, but rather by an analysis of their
source. 6 4  The consideration of the reliability of that
source rests with the trial court judge. District courts are
given broad discretion to admit or to exclude reports
based on the trustworthiness determination. 65 Because
the party offering the public record is counting on its reli-
ability, the burden of proving that the record is untrust-
worthy lies with the party opposing admission.1 66
The trustworthiness ofJAG investigative reports similar
to those at issue in the Rainey case has been considered by
other courts. Two separate suits arose out of a Navy air-
plane crash that occurred on December 21, 1975.167 Each
court determined the trustworthiness requirement for two
ity to exclude if 'the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of
trustworthiness'." FED. R. EvID. 803(6) advisory committee's note (citation
omitted).
164 United States v. American Tel. & Tel., 498 F. Supp. 353, 360 (D.D.C. 1980).
The court stated that "[tihe rationale for the admissibility of factual findings con-
tained in public records ... lies in their fundamental trustworthiness. The guar-
antee of trustworthiness does not necessarily reside in the contents of the records,
be they facts or conclusions, but rather in their source." Id. (footnote omitted).
l-, See Franklin v. Skelly Oil Co., 141 F.2d 568 (10th Cir. 1944). The court
stated "[t]he search is for truth and the trial court is the first and best judge of
whether tendered evidence meets that standard of trustworthiness and reliability
which will entitle it to stand as evidence of an issuable fact, absent the test of
cross-examination." Id. at 572; see supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Franklin.
-,i See, e.g., United States v. Versaint, 849 F.2d 827, 831 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding
that "the party objecting to inclusion [must] make an affirmative showing that the
proffered evidence is untrustworthy"); Ellis v. International Playtex Inc., 745 F.2d
292, 301 (4th Cir. 1984) ("[pllacing the burden on the opposing party makes con-
siderable practical sense. Most government sponsored investigations employ well
accepted methodological means of gathering and analyzing data. It is unfair to
put the party seeking admission to the test of 're-inventing the wheel' each time a
report is offered"); Complaint of Paducah Towing Co., 692 F.2d 412, 421 (6th Cir.
1982), (holding that "the burden of showing that the sources of information are
untrustworthy is on the opponent of the evidence .... ); AT&T, 498 F. Supp. at
364, (stating that "the burden is on the party disputing admissibility to prove the
factual finding to be untrustworthy").
... Sage v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 477 F. Supp. 1205 (D.N.H. 1979); Fraley v.
Rockwell Int'l Corp., 470 F. Supp. 1264 (S.D. Ohio 1979).
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reports prepared pursuant to the United States Navy in-
vestigation of the crash: a Naval Rework Facility Report
and a Judge Advocate General Report. 68 Although both
courts admitted the Naval Rework Facility Report, 69 in
Fraley the court excluded the JAG Report based on a de-
termination that an inexperienced investigator was not re-
liable and therefore not trustworthy.17 0 In Sage, however,
the court determined that inexperience did not affect the
admissibility of the evidence, but rather, it affected the
weight the evidence should be given.' 7 1
The courts that have made an assessment of trustwor-
thiness often employ the factors set out by the Advisory
Committee in its note to Rule 803(8)(C). 72 The District
of Columbia District Court determined that a special gov-
ernment review of witnesses two years after events took
place undermined the timeliness factor of the trustworthi-
ness of the government's subsequent report. 73  Many
courts have deemed reports untrustworthy based on an
analysis of the skill and experience of the record's crea-
tor.'74 The court in Baker v. Elcona Homes Corp. justified its
lo" Fraley, 470 F. Supp. at 1264. The first report issued was prepared by the
Judge Advocate General's Office and discussed the general circumstances sur-
rounding the crash. The other report was prepared by the Naval Rework Facility
at Alameda, California and contained conclusions about the cause of the crash
that were developed from engineering analysis based upon the airplane wreckage.
Id.
.is, Sage, 477 F. Supp. at 1210; Fraley, 470 F. Supp. at 1267.
,7" Fraley, 470 F.Supp. at 1267 ("The document was prepared by an inexperi-
enced investigator in a highly complex field of investigation. Thus, this document
lacks the reliability to be admitted into evidence.").
171 Sage, 477 F. Supp. at 1205; cf. Diaz v. United States, 655 F. Supp. 411, 417
(E.D. Va. 1987) (court properly admitted the JAG report concerning slip and fall
aboard Navy ship as "trustworthy" in suit brought by business invitee against gov-
ernment. Even though report was prepared by a party litigant, any discrepancy
between the invitee plaintiffs account of events and the report went to weight
rather than admissibility).
17. See supra note 87 and accompanying text for a listing of the four factors.
17-1 United States v. Durrani, 659 F. Supp. 1183 (D. Conn. 1987) (court refused
to admit portions of the Tower Commission Report regarding the Iran-Contra
affair because there had been a two-year lapse of time between events and subse-
quent witness interviews).
171 See Jenkins v. Whittaker Corp., 785 F.2d 720 (9th Cir.) (in action brought
against manufacturer of atomic simulator which exploded killing soldiers, court
excluded as untrustworthy reports investigating the incident where the reports'
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admission of a police officer's conclusory statement on a
strict application of all four factors. 175 Although the Sixth
Circuit found that the occurrence of a hearing is not al-
ways a necessary factor, the Tenth Circuit, in Denny v.
Hutchinson Sales Corp.,176 recognized that the lack of formal
proceedings in a Civil Rights Commission hearing was
sufficient to indicate lack of trustworthiness. 177 The Advi-
sory Committee's fourth factor of motivation problems
has been applied by several courts to deny reports'
admissibility. 178
The Advisory Committee explicitly stated that other
factors could be added to its original list of four. 179 In
authors had no competence or experience with atomic simulators), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 918 (1986); Matthews v. Ashland Chem., Inc., 770 F.2d 1303 (5th Cir. 1985)
(court upheld trial court's determination that trustworthiness was lacking based
on finding that investigator of propane accident did not have special skill and had
not fully researched all potential causes of the fire); Meder v. Everest &Jennings,
Inc., 637 F.2d 1182 (8th Cir. 1981) (in products liability action against manufac-
turer of wheelchair, court found lack of trustworthiness where police officer inves-
tigating injury could not recall the source of information in the report); cf. Faries
v. Atlas Truck Body Mfg., 797 F.2d 619 (8th Cir. 1986) (in suit resulting from
accident involving motorcycle and truck, the court found the state trooper that
investigated the crash to be experienced, but found his report untrustworthy be-
cause the investigation was incomplete and lacking in physical measurement data).
17., Baker v. Elcona Homes Corp., 588 F.2d 551, 558 (6th Cir. 1978). The court
determined that (1) the officer arrived minutes after the crash and the investiga-
tion was begun immediately; (2) the officer had 28 years experience in the investi-
gation of automobile accidents; (3) a formal hearing was not appropriate to the
case and did not appear always to be required; and (4) the officer was completely
independent and impartial. Id. at 588.
17, 649 F.2d 816 (10th Cir. 1981) (approving exclusion of a housing report in
discrimination suit that was based on an ex parte hearing that afforded no oppor-
tunity for cross-examination of witnesses).
177 Id. at 820-22.
,71 See Miller v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 697 F.2d 141 (6th Cir. 1983) (determin-
ing that report of United State Bureau of Mines into the circumstances of an acci-
dent that killed plaintiffs decedent possessed no indicia of trustworthiness since
report's author had no first hand knowledge and no authority to render opinions);
Dallas & Mavis Forwarding Co. v. Stegall, 659 F.2d 721 (6th Cir. 1981) (finding
untrustworthy the report of officer investigating accident where his report was
based on a a story given to him by employee of plaintiff); McKimmon v. Skil
Corp., 638 F.2d 270 (1st Cir. 1981) (excluding reports of Consumer Product
Safety Commission concerning prior accidents in suit against manufacturer of
electric saw since the bulk of the reports were simply paraphrasing of individual
consumer claims).
.... FED. R. EvID. 803(8) advisory committee's note ("Others no doubt could be
added.").
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Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. the dis-
trict court was confronted with an admissibility question
concerning a large volume of both U.S. and foreign gov-
ernment documents.' 80 The court accepted the Advisory
Committee's suggestion and created seven additional cri-
teria to aid in the disposition of the reports.' 8' Although
the additional criteria have not been widely implemented
in other courts, they may serve a valuable purpose in im-
proving the examination of public records.'8 2
Courts have taken different approaches to the trustwor-
thiness problem in reports of legislative findings pursuant
to Congressional investigation. The Pearce v. E.F. Hutton
Group, Inc. and Baker v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. courts
held that congressional hearing reports were inadmissible
not only because they did not contain factual findings, but
also because they lacked sufficient trustworthiness.183
Both decisions denied application of the hearsay excep-
tion due to the political motivations that could taint the
objectiveness of the particular congressional report. 84
... 505 F. Supp. 1125 (E.D. Pa. 1980), afd in part, rev'd in part sub nom, In re
Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd on other
grounds, 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
is, Id. at 1147. The seven new factors include: (1) the finality of the agency
findings, (2) the extent to which the findings rest on inadmissible evidence sup-
plied by interested parties, (3) where hearings are employed, the extent to which
appropriate safeguards are applied and observed, (4) the extent to which there is
an ascertainable record on which the findings are based, (5) the extent to which
the findings express a policy judgment rather than a factual adjudication, (6) the
extent to which the findings rest upon findings by other bodies which may be
suspect, and (7) where the findings rest upon expert opinion, the extent to which
the facts or data on which the opinion is based are reasonably relied on by experts
in the field. Id. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit declined to endorse
the seven criteria listed by the Zenith court, but also rejected the contention that a
trial court is limited by the four factors listed by the Advisory Committee. In re
Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238, 265 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd on
other grounds, 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
1$2 See Comment, The Public Documents Hearsay Exception for Evaluative Reports: Fact
or Fiction?, 63 TUL. L. REV. 121, 145-46 (1988) (suggesting that the additional
factors in Zenith help insure that reliable, concrete findings are substantiated).
I", See Baker v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 793 F.2d 1196, 1199 (11th Cir.
1986); Pearce v. E.F. Hutton Group, 653 F. Supp. 810, 814 (D.D.C. 1987).
-4 Baker, 793 F.2d at 1199 ("We agree with the district court that this report
lacks the trustworthiness necessary to bring rule 803(8)(C) into play. . . . The
subcommittee report did not contain factual findings necessary to an objective
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However, in De Letelier v. Republic of Chile,t85 the district
court upheld the admissibility of reports presented at a
hearing before the House of Representatives based on a
failure to show lack of trustworthiness. 186
The foundation of the hearsay exception for public in-
vestigatory reports and records is the reliability of the cir-
cumstances surrounding the completion of the report.
The trustworthiness provision in Rule 803(8)(C) forces a
court to guarantee that the record was made in a reliable
fashion. Each factor recommended by the Advisory Com-
mittee has been employed in appropriate situations to un-
dermine the trustworthiness of a record. The
trustworthiness analysis is Rule 803(8)(C)'s guarantee
against the admission of government reports not based on
factual findings.
V. SUPREME COURT ANALYSIS OF RULE 803(8)(C):
BEECH AIRCRAFT CORP. V. RAINEY (RAINEY III)
The Supreme Court settled many of the uncertainties
and disagreements over Rule 803(8)(C) when it rendered
its decision in Rainey 111,187 on December 12, 1988. Mr.
Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court, and
was joined by a unanimous vote on Parts I and II concern-
ing Rule 803(8)(C). 88 In Part I of the opinion, Justice
Brennan recounted the factual record of the crash' 89 and
investigation, but consisted of the rather heated conclusions of a politically moti-
vated hearing."); Pearce, 653 F. Supp. at 814 ("Given the obvious political nature
of Congress, it is questionable whether any report by a committee or subcommit-
tee of that body could be admitted under rule 803(8)(C) against a private party.
There would appear to be too great a danger that political considerations might
affect the findings of such a report.").
115 567 F. Supp. 1490 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 748 F.2d 790 (2d
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1125 (1985).
-; Id. at 1496-97 (congressional reports and statements by government agen-
cies at hearings of House of Representatives were admissible under Rule
803(8)(C) because there was no substantial showing that the circumstances indi-
cated lack of trustworthiness).
1 7 109 S. Ct. 439 (1988).
- Id. at 442.
-, Id. at 443-45; see supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the facts of the crash.
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the procedural history of the case in the lower courts. 9 °
After beginning Part II of the opinion with an inclusion
of the text of Rule 803(8)(C),' 9' the court recognized that
controversy over the scope of the Rule divided the federal
courts of appeal from the beginning. 92 The Court cited
the Smith v. Ithaca Corp. case relied on by the Eleventh Cir-
cuit as a narrow reading of the scope of the term "factual
findings.' 93  The Court reasoned, however, that the
broader interpretation employed by the Sixth Circuit in
Baker v. Elcona Homes Corp. 19' was more representative of
the circuits that had squarely confronted the issue. 195
Drawing support from the authors of the leading evidence
treatises as additional authority, 196 the Court held that
"factually based conclusions or opinions are not on that
, Rainey III, 109 S.Ct. at 445; see supra notes 4-24 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the procedural history.
-, Rainey III, 109 S. Ct. at 445; see supra note 15 for the text of the Rule.
1112 Rainey III, 109 S.Ct. at 446.
1 Id.
Id. The court quoted the Sixth Circuit's holding that "factual findings ad-
missible under Rule 803(8)(C) may be those which are made by the preparer of
the report from disputed evidence .... Baker v. Elcona Homes Corp., 588 F.2d
551, 557-58 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 993 (1979); see supra notes 139-
141 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Eleona Homes case.
,on Rainey III, 109 S. Ct. at 446. Cases the Court determined had squarely con-
fronted the issue included Jenkins v. Whittaker Corp., 785 F.2d 720 (9th Cir.) cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 918 (1986); Perrin v. Anderson, 784 F.2d 1040 (10th Cir. 1986);
Ellis v. International Playtex Inc., 745 F.2d 292 (4th Cir. 1984); Kehm v. Proctor &
Gamble Mfg., 724 F.2d 613 (8th Cir. 1983); Melville v. American Home Assur-
ance Co., 584 F.2d 1306 (3d Cir. 1978). For discussion of these cases, see Jenkins,
supra note 174; Perrin, supra notes 160-162 and accompanying text; Ellis and Kehm,
supra notes 151-153 and accompanying text; Velville, supra notes 136-138 and ac-
companying text.
11m Rainey 11, 109 S. Ct. at 446 n.7. The Court found that several treatises rec-
ommended a broad interpretation:
E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 316, at 890, n.7 (3d ed.
1984); M. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE 886 (2d ed.
1986); R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO Evi-
DENCE 449-50 (2d ed. 1982); G. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
LAW OF EVIDENCE 275-76 (2d ed. 1987); 4 D. LouISELL & C. MUEL-
LER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 455, at 740-741 (1980); 4J. WEINSTEIN &
M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 803(8) [03], at 803-250 to 803-
252 (1987).
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account excluded from the scope of Rule 803(8) (C).' ' 97
Once Justice Brennan presented the initial summation
of the elements of the Court's decision, he turned to a
specific analysis of the language of Rule 803(8)(C) it-
self.'"9 8 He reasoned that the narrow interpretation of the
term "factual findings" espoused in Smith v. Ithaca Corp.
reflected a perceived dichotomy between "fact" and
"opinion."' 9 9 The Fifth Circuit had perceived this distinc-
tion from language in Rule 803(6) expressly including
"opinions" and "diagnoses" that was not present in Rule
803(8)(C). 20 0 Justice Brennan rejected the Fifth Circuit's
conclusion that this differing language indicated that "fac-
tual findings" meant something other than opinions.20 '
He determined that the Advisory Committee's Note on
Rule 803(8)(C) strongly suggested that this Rule had the
same scope of admissibility as Rule 803(6).202
After rejecting the analysis of Smith v. Ithaca Corp., the
Court emphasized that "factual findings" should not be
read to mean simply "facts. '20 3 The Court cited Black's
Law Dictionary to show that a "finding of fact" is broad
197 Id. at 446.
1', Id. Justice Brennan cited INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987), for
the requirement that a legislative enactment be construed through the "tradi-
tional tools of statutory construction." Id.
-, Id.
2... See supra notes 102-107 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Smith
decision.
2-" Rainey III, 109 S. Ct. at 446. Justice Brennan examined the particular moti-
vation of the Advisory Committee in drafting Rule 803(6):
While opinions were rarely found in traditional "business records,"
the expansion of that category to encompass documents such as
medical diagnoses and test results brought with it some uncertainty
in earlier versions of the Rule as to whether diagnoses and the like
were admissible. "In order to make clear its adherence to the [posi-
tion favoring admissibility]," the Committee stated "the rule specifi-
cally includes both diagnoses and opinions in addition to acts,
events, and conditions, as proper subjects of admissible entries."
quoting Advisory Committee's Notes on Fed. Rule Evid. 803(6)) ....
Since that specific concern was not present in the context of Rule
803(8)(C), the absence of identical language should not be accorded
much significance.
Id. at 446-47 n.8.
2- I d.
2113 Id. at 447.
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enough to include conclusions.2 °4 At a minimum, the
Court found that the language of the Rule did not compel
such a narrow reading of the phrase "factual findings. 20 5
The Court further pointed out that Rule 803(8)(C) does
not allow admission of "factual findings", but rather, the
Rule assumes admission of "reports ... setting forth...
factual findings".2° 6 This clarification highlighted the
Court's finding that the language of Rule 803(8)(C) does
not distinguish fact from opinion.20 7
The Court then turned its analysis towards the legisla-
tive history of Rule 803(8)(C). The Court explained that
unlike some statutory analysis where there is a dearth of
legislative comment on the precise question, both Houses
of Congress expressed their views on the language of
Rule 803(8)(C). 20 8 However, the Court found that the
Houses had not only expressed opposite views on the
scope of the Rule, but failed to reconcile their differ-
ences. 20 9 The Court recognized that this conflicting legis-
lative approach caused interpretation problems. 210  The
legislative record, therefore, was found to provide no
clear answer to the scope of the Rule's language. 2 1' The
Court determined, however, that the Senate Judiciary
Committee's broader interpretation was more consistent
with both the Rule itself and the comments of the Advi-
sory Committee.21 2
2... Id. A "finding of fact" is defined as a "conclusion by way of reasonable in-
ference from the evidence." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 569 (5th ed. 1979).
..... Raine' I1, 109 S. Ct. at 447.
201; Id.; see supra note 15 for the complete text of Rule 803(8)(C).
27 Rainey Ill, 109 S. Ct. at 447.
'- Id.; see supra notes 92-93 for the text of the Notes of both the HouseJudiciary
Committee and the Senate Judiciary Committee. Justice Brennan included the
transcript of these Notes in the Court's opinion. Rainey III, 109 S.Ct. at 447-48.
'-"w Rainey II1, 109 S.Ct. at 447; see supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text for
a discussion of the diametrically opposite stances taken by the House and Senate
concerning the interpretation of Rule 803(8)(C).
Rainey I1, 109 S.Ct. at 447 ("Indeed, in this case the legislative history may
well be at the origin of the dispute.").
211 Id. at 447-48. Justice Brennan concluded: "Clearly this legislative history
reveals a difference of view between the Senate and the House that affords no
definitive guide to the congressional understanding." Id. at 448.
212 Id.
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Once Justice Brennan concluded that the legislative his-
tory was insufficient to determine the scope of the Rule,
he reviewed the Notes of the Advisory Committee for di-
rection.21 3 These comments were particularly important
since Congress had not amended the Committee's
draft. 214 The Court recognized that the Advisory Com-
mittee cited federal statutes that made evaluative reports
admissible and cited cases in which admissibility had been
both sustained and denied.21 5 In all the instances, the re-
ports had stated conclusions. The Advisory Committee's
discussion and inclusion of such reports was a clear indi-
cation to Justice Brennan that its focus was strictly on
whether "evaluative reports" should be admissible.2 16
The Advisory Committee comments overall were notable
for the lack of any mention of a dichotomy between
"facts" and "opinions" or "conclusions". 2 7 The Court
found no indication that the Advisory Committee even
considered admitting factual statements only.2 8  The
Court concluded that the Advisory Committee was con-
cerned only with the admissibility of "evaluative reports"
without regard to a distinction between facts and
conclusions219
See supra notes 86-91 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Advisory
Committee Notes.
2,4 Rainey III, 109 S. Ct. at 448 n.9. The court found: "As Congress did not
amend the Advisory Committee's draft in any way that touches on the question
before us, the Committee's commentary is particularly relevant in determining the
meaning of the document Congress enacted." Id.
-- I d. at 448; see supra note 90 for a listing of the statutes the Advisory Commit-
tee cited; see also supra note 41 and accompanying text for a discussion of the pre-
Rules cases the committee had cited.
-.. Rainey 111, 109 S. Ct. at 448. The Court observed: "[Wihat the Committee
referred to in the Rule's language as 'reports ... setting forth ... factual findings'




2-ID'Id. at 448 n. 10. Justice Brennan drew additional support for this particular
conclusion from the presence of a pre-Rules scholarly debate on the "fact" and
"conclusion" distinction.
Indeed, the problem was often phrased as one of whether official
reports could be admitted in view of thefact that they contained the inves-
tigator's conclusions. Thus Professor McCormick, in an influential arti-
The Court then analyzed the Advisory Committee's so-
lution as to the admissibility of evaluative reports. The
Court recognized that the Committee gauged admissibil-
ity by two principles: first, the rule assumes admissibility,
and second, it provides for escape if negative factors are
present.220 Justice Brennan determined that the "escape
provision" referred to by the Committee is embodied in
the final trustworthiness clause of the Rule. 22' Therefore,
the Court found that the Committee meant for all of the
information in evaluative reports to be admissible unless
the contents were gathered in an untrustworthy fash-
ion.222 The Court made it clear that a trial judge has an
obligation to exclude facts, conclusions, or an entire re-
port if circumstances indicate a lack of trustworthiness. 223
Other portions of the Federal Rules were cited as addi-
tional safeguards available to the trial judge in scrutiniz-
ing evaluative reports.224  Justice Brennan further
emphasized that an opponent's right to contradict or di-
minish the conclusory portions of reports is his ultimate
safeguard.2 25
cle relied upon by the Committee, stated his position as follows:
"that evaluative reports of official investigators, though partly based
upon statements of others, and though embracing conclusions, are admis-
sible as evidence of the facts reported."
Id. (quoting McCormick, supra note 87, at 365); see supra note 87 for additional
discussion of Professor McCormick's article.
Rainey 111, 109 S. Ct. at 448; see supra notes 85-87.
22 Rainey II1, 109 S. Ct. at 448; see supra notes 163-186 and accompanying text
for a discussion of instances where courts implemented the trustworthiness
provision.
22', Rainey Il, 109 S. Ct. at 448. Justice Brennan explained that the "trustwor-
thiness inquiry - and not an arbitrary distinction between 'fact' and 'opinion' -
was the Committee's primary safeguard against the admission of unreliable evi-
dence, and it is important to note that it applies to all elements of the report." Id.
.... Id. The Court cited the four factors the Advisory Committee proposed to
assist in the trustworthiness inquiry. Id. at 449 n. 11; see supra note 87 and accom-
panying text for a discussion of these four factors. Although no party challenged
the district court's finding that the JAG Report was trustworthy, the Court noted
that in Fraley, a JAG Report was found to be untrustworthy. See supra notes 167-
170 and accompanying text for a discussion of Fraley.
2 Rainey III, 109 S. Ct. at 449. Justice Brennan referred to the rules dealing
with relevance and prejudice. See FED. R. EvID. 401-403.
12"2.,, Rainey 111, 109 S. Ct. at 449.
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The Court then focused directly on the analytical diffi-
culty of making a distinction between "fact" and "opin-
ion."'226 Justice Brennan consulted several evidence
226 At oral argument, the Court indicated its concern over the difficulty of draw-
ing a line between fact and opinion. The following exchange occurred during the
presentation of Mr. Joseph W. Womack, counsel for Beech Aircraft Corporation:
Question: But where do you want us to draw the line between what
is factual finding, and what is not a factual finding? ... Do you think
a finding that the pilot was negligent would not be a factual finding?
Mr. Womack: I think that a finding that the pilot was negligent
would be too close to a legal conclusion. . . .And to answer the
bottom line question of your Honor, I would ask you to consider
drawing the line, if the Court chooses to draw a line, just on the
other side of probabilities and just this side of legal conclusions and
fixation of legal liability.
Oral Transcript at 15-16, Rainey III, (Nos. 87-981 and 87-1028). During the pres-
entation of Mr. Dennis K. Larry, counsel forJohn Rainey, the following exchange
took place:
Chief Justice Rehnquist: Aren't we then just embroiled in the tradi-
tional distinction of 50 and 60 years ago, the difference between fact
and opinion?
Mr. Larry: Justice Rehnquist, I believe that this Court, I believe that
courts, can see a difference, and can distinguish between what an
investigator finds as a fact, based upon his evaluation of evidence,
and what is pure opinion.
ChiefJustice Rehnquist: Surely anyone trained as a lawyer would be
able to see things at either end of that spectrum. But the difficulties
come in the middle, where very competent trial judges, very compe-
tent lawyers may see things differently. And do we want reversals of
trials because the trial judge saw it one way, rather than the other, in
the middle of the spectrum?
Mr. Larry: Your Honor, what we want is for the trial judge to make a
determination as to whether the report qualifies under the rule, and
not simply let the entire report in just because in some cases, it may
be difficult to distinguish opinion and fact. I think that what we have
here is a rule that carefully used words, "findings of fact" and never
used the word "opinion" in any of the Advisory Committee notes.
Id. at 26-27. The following questions were asked later in Mr. Larry's presentation:
Question: Suppose ... it was clear that the weather wasn't affected,
[the investigator] simply expressed himself by saying, it is my firm
opinion that weather was not a factor. Would that be a factual
point?
Mr. Larry: The court could very well determine that although he
called it an opinion, he simply made a finding of fact. I don't think
we can turn on what the investigator called it.
treatises to show that the difference between fact and
opinion is a matter of degree.2 2 v The Court then cited
one of the factual findings contained in the JAG Report
and questioned whether the statement couldn't just as
easily have been labeled an opinion.228  The Court rea-
soned that this close proximity between fact and opinion
will always be present in investigative reports. Therefore,
the Court concluded that instead of creating an arbitrary
line between fact and opinion, Rule 803(8)(C) requires
admission of "reports ... setting forth. . . factual find-
ings. '"229 The Court then explained the Rule's inherent
limitations. The first limitation is that statements must be
based on a factual investigation.2 3 0 The second limitation
is that the report be sufficiently trustworthy.23 t
The final source of authority called upon by the Court
was the general approach of the Federal Rules to "opin-
ion" testimony. Justice Brennan pointed out that Rules
702-705 permit expert testimony on all range of opinions,
Question: I hope not. But I don't know what we're turning on, if
we're not turning on that.
Id. at 31-32. These questions asked of the different counsel during oral argument
indicate the depth of the Court's uncertainty in attempting to draw a line between
fact and opinion.
'_, 7 Rainey III, 109 S. Ct. at 449; see E. CLEARY, supra note 36, § 11, at 27 ("There
is no conceivable statement however specific, detailed and 'factual' that is not in
some measure the product of inference and reflection as well as observation and
memory"); R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, supra note 196, at 449 ("A factual finding,
unless it is a simple report of something observed, is an opinion as to what more
basic facts imply").
22K Rainey III, 109 S. Ct. at 449. Justice Brennan stated:
In the present case, the trial court had no difficulty in admitting as a
factual finding the statement in the JAG Report that "[alt the time of
impact, the engine of 3E955 was operating but was operating a re-
duced power." Surely this "factual finding" could also be character-
ized as an "opinion", which the investigator presumably arrived at
on the basis of clues contained in the airplane wreckage.
Id.
Id"-2 Id.; FED. R. EVID. 803(8)(C).
2'- Rainey 111, 109 S. Ct. at 449 ("[T]he requirement that reports contain factual
findings bars the admission of statements not based on factual investigation.").
231 Id. ("[Tlhe trustworthiness provision requires the court to make a determi-
nation as to whether the report, or any portion thereof, is sufficiently trustworthy
to be admitted.").
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even those concerning "ultimate issues. ' 232 Additionally,
the Court noted that Rule 701 allows lay witnesses to give
opinion testimony.233 The Court found these Rules to in-
dicate a liberal approach toward the admission of opinion
testimony. 4 The Court reasoned that Rule 803(8)(C)
should be consistent with that trend.235
The Supreme Court held that portions of public investi-
gatory reports are not inadmissible under Rule 803(8)(C)
merely because they state a conclusion or opinion. "As
long as the conclusion is based on a factual investigation
and satisfies the Rule's trustworthiness requirement, it
should be admissible along with other portions of the re-
port. ' 2 36 The Court determined that because the district
court found the JAG Report to be trustworthy, the admis-
sion of its opinions into evidence was correct.2 3 7 The
Court therefore reversed the judgment of the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals.
The Supreme Court's analysis provides a clear and de-
finitive guide to the future implementation of Rule
803(8)(C). It resolves the division of interpretation be-
tween the circuit courts. Particularly, in the Fifth and
Eleventh Circuits, the Court's rejection of the Smith v. Ith-
aca Corp. analysis denotes a different admissibility stan-
dard. Instead of requiring trial judges to make a
distinction between the fact and opinion material in-
cluded in a report of a public investigation, the Court's
holding allows judges to assume that a factually based in-
vestigatory report is admissible. The trial judge, however,
has an obligation to determine that all portions of a re-
port were completed in a reliable and trustworthy fashion.
2:12 Id. at 450; see supra note 53 for the text of the rules cited by justice Brennan.
,2:,:, Rainey III, 109 S. Ct. at 450.
2.4 Id.
235 Id. ("We see no reason to strain to reach an interpretation of Rule 803(8)(C)
that is contrary to the liberal thrust of the Federal Rules.").
236 Id. The Court was careful to note that its holding had no bearing on the
distinction between fact and law. The Court stated: "We thus express no opinion
on whether legal conclusions contained in an official report are admissible as
'findings of fact' under Rule 803(8)(C)." Id. at 450 n.13.
2:17 Id. at 450.
Unlike the arbitrary analysis inherent in dividing fact from
opinion, the trial judge can apply the trustworthiness fac-
tors to gauge the circumstances in which a report is
completed.
In federal district court practice, the Supreme Court's
analysis of Rule 803(8)(C) will lead to greater admissibil-
ity of the conclusion and opinion portions of government
investigatory reports. This decision is beneficial because
it ultimately means that a trier of fact will have more infor-
mation upon which to base a decision. One potential neg-
ative effect is a greater likelihood that persons completing
investigatory records will write the opinion and conclu-
sion portions with an eye towards future litigation. In
other words, government officials will have more opportu-
nity to affect the ultimate resolution of certain issues. The
trustworthiness analysis, however, will prevent any such
biased record completion from being admitted into evi-
dence.238 The Supreme Court's emphasis on the trust-
worthiness determination requires trial judges to analyze
carefully the circumstances in which a report is
completed.
Although innumerable contexts exist in which investi-
gations are conducted pursuant to government authority,
the model of analysis set out in the Rainey III decision
provides a uniform scheme to gauge potential trial use.
The Supreme Court's thorough analysis emphasized that
Rule 803(8)(C) does not allow admission of only factual
findings, but rather, allows admission of the contents of
reports that are based on factual findings. As long as an
investigatory record is based on factual findings, and com-
pleted pursuant to authority granted by law, it is pre-
sumed admissible. The trustworthiness safeguard will
vary with each district court judge, but application of the
Advisory Committee factors will insure that a public in-
vestigatory record will be analyzed consistently through-
out the federal district courts.
2:. See supra note 87 and accompanying text for a discussion of motivation as
one of the factors which can undermine trustworthiness.
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CONCLUSION
The evolution of an exception to the hearsay doctrine
for public records and reports has been plagued with un-
certainty over the scope of admissibility. Since the com-
mon law period, courts recognized the efficiency value in
admitting government records. Courts were reluctant,
however, to allow the opinion statements of government
officials into evidence. A perception existed that an offi-
cial's opinion statements were distinct from and less relia-
ble than his factual statements.
Congress recognized the public records exception to
the hearsay doctrine in Rule 803(8)(C). Unfortunately,
Congress did not give the federal courts clear direction as
to what the language of the Rule was to include. Because
the Rule focused around the phrase "factual findings,"
many of the circuits continued to recognize the common
law distinction between fact and opinion portions of pub-
lic investigatory reports. This interpretation is no longer
valid. In Rainey III the Supreme Court determined that
Rule 803(8)(C) does not on its face exclude opinion and
conclusory statements. Opinion and conclusory state-
ments contained in government investigatory reports are
now admissible unless they are determined to be untrust-
worthy. The Supreme Court has resolved a longstanding
conflict among the federal courts of appeal. The decision
provides litigants with a consistent and uniform guide to
the proper scope of admission for government investiga-
tory reports under Rule 803(8)(C).
